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Er det muligt for nationalstater at understøtte ci-
vilsamfundsorganisationer økonomisk, uden at 
civilsamfundet samtidig mister sin kritiske distan-
ce til staten? I denne artikel undersøger post.doc. 
Acar Kutay de normative implikationer, der følger 
af at integrere civilsamfundet i nye former for poli-
tisk styring. Artiklen fokuserer særligt på økono-
miske bevillinger og disses implikationer for ci-
vilsamfundets autenticitet og autonomi. Artiklens 
overordnede argument er, at øget integration har 
medført en teknokratisering og professionalise-
ring af civilsamfundet, som i sidste ende slører 
den funktionelle opdeling mellem stat, marked og 
civilsamfund.
Introduction
Most scholars view the recent massive increase in the 
number of non-governmental organisations (NGOs), 
or civil society organisations (CSOs) across the globe as 
a sign of positive civil society development. CSOs are 
considered an important component of democratisation; 
engagement in CSOs, so the traditional narrative goes, 
can help citizens participate more effectively in the self-
governance of their societies and restrict the excesses of 
the state and the business/corporate sector (Kaldor 2005; 
Edwards 2004; Anheier 2004). However, I apply a critical 
approach in this paper to the dominant opinion that the 
increase in CSOs and the increased influence of prag-
matic governance in CSOs is by definition a positive de-
velopment. I am interested in the normative implications 
of pragmatic governance as it currently affects civil soci-
ety and also explore the effects of managerial thinking on 
the emergence of new actors in civil society. 
Pragmatic governance refers to recent changes in 
public administration and policy making. It has brought 
about the weakening of the state by the devolution of its 
responsibilities among non-state actors and has aimed 
to execute non-ideological politics. It prioritises the out-
comes of policy making and administration over politics. 
Managerialism, on the other hand, suggests an organising 
principle for society, and an ideology, that implies that any 
type of organisation (the state, corporations, NGOs, and 
even supermarkets) should be managed according to the 
same type of management principles, policies, and tasks.
First, the traditional, dominant normative view of 
civil society relies on a particular (liberal) conception of 
civil society that was first articulated by the 19th century 
political thinker Alexis de Tocqueville. De Toqueville’s 
observations of civic associations in the America of the 
1830s and 1840s describe what we now call civil society 
as autonomous, i.e. independent of the state, and compo-
sed of spontaneous and voluntary organisations. 
However, the beginnings of civil society that de 
Tocqueville observed have evolved over time to a very 
different type of organisation. Today, CSOs are often 
imposed upon societies that have no history of sponta-
neous association with the deliberate political intention 
to create a civil society where it does not exist. Moreover, 
there has been an increasing incorporation of some CSOs 
into pragmatic governance settings that exhibit techno-
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cratic and managerial tendencies that do not reflect our 
original idea of how civil society emerges in a society and 
by what norms they operate. In fact, this re-defining of 
the normative ideas and the functioning of civil society 
constitutes nothing short of a revolution in their role in 
any given society. 
What is more, pragmatic governance opens up deci-
sion-making processes to non-state actors, including ci-
vil society, that have been the traditional domain of the 
governance sector. The traditional approach of civil soci-
ety does not support such practice: these associations have 
long been considered important for democracy because 
they create and strengthen civic bonds in a given commu-
nity and act as a counterpoint to the state (Putnam 1993; 
Habermas 1992; 1996). In other words, not only is the 
de Tocquevellian view of civil society incompatible with 
pragmatic governance, it is arguably now counter-factual.
Second, we need to rethink the traditional liberal ap-
proach that defines the state, the economy and civil soci-
ety as autonomous entities, or as domains that are struc-
turally differentiated from each other. This is particularly 
true when non-state actors such as CSOs share political 
power by taking responsibility for public administration 
and governing. The meshing of the technocratic style of 
policy making and managerial organisation with the new 
pragmatic governance also blurs the distinction among 
state, economic and civil society actors because each of 
these actors in this new arrangement is administered by 
common organisational values, norms, and goals. 
Third, the procedures and formal structures through 
which civil society has been integrated into the institu-
tional settings of governance may foster the formation 
of new managerial actors within civil society who are 
willing and able to take part in the governance of soci-
ety. This means that CSOs now engaged in pragmatic 
governance are not representative of an authentic or auto-
nomous civil society.
In this paper, I discuss the implications of pragmatic 
governance and managerial thinking and practices for 
civil society. The first section provides an overview of the 
associational revolution in recent years and evaluates the 
strategy of involving NGOs in pragmatic governance. 
The second section examines the implications of the pro-
cedures and formal structures through which civil soci-
ety has been integrated into the institutional settings of 
governance. The third section reflects upon the general 
effects of managerialism and pragmatic governance on 
civil society. 
Context and normative theory
Since the 1990s, we have witnessed a massive growth of 
NGOs both in the global South and the North, a histo-
rical moment that has been described as an ‘associational 
revolution’ (Salamon 1994). Relying on the documenta-
tion of Lang (2012, 13), ‘[n]ational surveys have counted 
more than one million NGOs in India (Sooryamoor-
thy and Gangrage 2001), 359,000 registered in Russia 
(Skvortsova 2007), 55,000 in Poland (Garzstecki 2006), 
570,000 in Germany in 2008 (DGVM 2007; Vereinssta-
tistisk 2008), and 161,000 in Canada (Statistics Canada 
2005)’. Most of these associations have not emerged spon-
taneously, and many depend on external funding from 
government, bilateral aid agencies working in interna-
tional development, international organisations (World 
Bank, United Nations), the European Union (EU), 
and political and private foundations (Reimann 2006, 
48; Salamon 2010; Swyngedouw 2005). An expert on 
the role of this NGO funding boom suggests, ‘It is im-
possible to understand the explosive growth of NGOs 
in the past several decades without taking into account 
the ways in which states, international organisations, and 
other structures have actively stimulated and promoted 
NGOs from above’ (Reimann 2006, 46 ). This process is 
also occurring in the US, whose political system is based 
on the liberal policy of non-intervention in civil society 
(Salamon 1995). 
Non-profit organisations that focus on delivery of 
services have been supported largely by governments and 
other foundations in recent decades (Reimann 2006; 
Walker 1991; Berry 1999). Reimann (2006, 48) calcula-
tes that since the late 1990s, an average of $6–8 million 
per year was transferred from the West to the South with 
the political intention of improving civil society. In 2009 
alone, the European Commission spent €1.4 billion on 
approximately 300 CSOs (European Parliament 2010; 
Salgado-Sanchez 2014; Mahoney and Beckstrand 2011). 
Some commentators suggest that the simultaneous 
‘appearance’ of the associational revolution, pragmatic 
governance and the entrenchment of neoliberal hege-
mony might not be a mere coincidence. Because prag-
matic governance depends on external contributions 
to policy making processes and the delivery of services 
(particularly in health and education), NGOs are now 
encouraged to become involved as partners and con-
tractors within new governance constellations. As such, 
NGOs and other non-state actors are taking over some of 
the roles of the state, thus weakening or dismantling the 
hierarchical bureaucracy and the state’s involvement in 
economic and social governance. In that sense, pragmatic 
governance has largely aligned with neoliberalism (Bevir 
2010): it is helping to hollow-out the state and sharing its 
core functions among non-state actors. 
The literature cited here discusses a number of dif-
ferent issues related to NGOs, including the perils of 
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exporting a Western model of state-society to the South 
(Mercer 2002) and reinforcing neoliberal policies (priva-
tisation of the public sector, structural adjustment poli-
cies) under the rallying cry of democracy promotion in 
Central and Eastern Europe (della Porta 2014) and Latin 
America (Leal 2007). Observers of the proliferation of 
associations also express concern about socially embed-
ding neoliberal capital accumulation by including a third 
sector in governance (Porter and Craig 2004) and invo-
king associations as a new form of governmentality (Fyfe 
2005; Morrison 2000; Kutay 2014). Some commentators 
even consider the participation discourse about the neces-
sity to engage civil society in governing a ‘new ideology’ 
(Cooke and Kothari 2001). 
This paper contributes to the literature on the NGO 
boom critically, and from a normative perspective. I sub-
mit that pragmatic governance is clearly aligned with the 
neoliberal project, and that the potential of civil society 
to legitimise government is threatened when the state and 
the economic sector expand into its sphere. Moreover, the 
traditional separation of the public and private is blurred 
when these organisations engage in public administration 
or delivery of services (Lang 2014; Morrison 2000). This 
trend compels us to question the third sector approach to 
governance and the prevailing conception of civil society 
today compared to the conception originally inspired by 
de Tocqueville. 
The following section evaluates the political aim 
to create civil society and to integrate some CSOs into 
governance settings. It suggests that the normative view 
of civil society as associational and autonomous is now 
counter-factual, or at the least limited under governance 
settings. 
Pragmatic governance is not a system of governance
Normative approaches to CSOs conceive them as prin-
cipal agents of participatory democracy (Gaventa 2004), 
as institutional venues for the promotion of identity and 
democratic values (Putnam 1993, Calhoun 1993), and as 
a ‘transmission belt’ between the citizenry and policy ma-
king processes (Nanz and Steffek 2004). A well-functio-
ning civil society is considered an important element of 
democratic legitimacy. But to what extent does participa-
tion of CSOs in governance follow normative theory, or 
are both normative and governance approaches informed 
by the same understanding and ontology of civil society? 
The argument is straightforward: if a normative view 
does not support the practice of the political interven-
tion in civil society and their involvement in governance, 
then the current CSO participation under new gover-
nance settings runs counter to the established norms. 
The concomitant argument is a more complicated one: if 
the social conditions which inform the normative theory 
have changed, then we should reconsider our conception 
of civil society. 
Given the widespread belief that ideological politics 
and representational democracy have proven inadequate 
to the management of contemporary governing issues, a 
pragmatic approach to governance and post-ideological 
ambitions is conceived by both scholars and NGOs as 
a rescue plan for democratic legitimacy. By adapting a 
functional approach to civic participation, pragmatic 
governance defines NGOs as legitimate according to 
their ability to contribute to solving common societal 
problems effectively by sharing the traditional responsibi-
lities of the state (Salgado-Sanchez 2014; Anheier 2004). 
Pragmatic governance implies that social issues can be fi-
xed by technical intervention and expertise and practiced 
through technocratic knowledge and often by evidence-
based policy (EBP). (EBP suggests that public policy and 
decision making should be accompanied by scientific 
evidence, or at the least by some form of evidence.) In 
pragmatic governance, participation, too, is considered 
evidence; such a conception of participation aims to go 
beyond ideology by reflecting the ‘real’ interests of the 
people (Head 2008). 
The problem here is that pragmatic governance blurs 
the division of labour between the state and civil soci-
ety. It leads to the de-politicisation of civic activism and 
stigmatises social conflicts and differences of opinion by 
ruling out, or actively discouraging, threatening and less 
predictable modes of social action like protests, informal 
gatherings, or spontaneous reactions (Leal 2007). On the 
whole, different interpretations of pragmatic governance 
such as ‘good governance’ and the ‘third sector approach’ 
rely on the view that civil society is inherently autono-
mous and ‘good’ when compared to the state. Yet, this 
view seems to stem more from hostility towards the state, 
which is associated with ineffectiveness, corruption, and 
use of power, than from intrinsic features of civil society. 
This point will be further expanded below. 
Evaluation of pragmatic governance
Pragmatic governance conflicts with another type of 
functional approach to governance that adopts a more 
sociological and systemic understanding and relates ci-
vil society to structural-functionalism (Kohler-Koch and 
Finke 2007; Kohler-Koch 2010; cf. Kooiman 1993). In 
this view, organisations derived from civil society are 
established to generate norms and values that democratise 
the system of governance. This democratising function 
of CSOs is a critical one because economic and political 
power, with their inner logic that prioritises instrumen-
tal and strategic rationalities (Habermas 1987; Baccaro 
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2006; Kohler-Koch and Finke 2007), cannot provide de-
mocratising norms and values (Habermas 1987; Baccaro 
2006; Kohler-Koch and Finke 2007). 
Both normative approaches to civil society and the 
systemic approach to governance find their inspiration in 
the ideas of Jurgen Habermas (1996) when they connect 
civil society discourses to political and public spheres. 
Habermas (1996) suggests that what makes a political 
system democratic is the transmission of discourses that 
emerge from within the ‘ life-world’ of society and enter 
the decision- and law-making structures of the political 
sector. However, Habermas (1996; 1992) does not sug-
gest transmitting discourses generated from within civil 
society to the decision-making structures of civil society 
itself. In his model, this task is realised by elections, po-
litical parties, and the media. 
Therefore, Habermas’s discourse ethics is not compa-
tible with, nor can it be stretched to fit pragmatic gover-
nance. In his view, particular interests advocated by social 
actors legitimise public policies if and when these inte-
rests express an all-encompassing or systemic understan-
ding of democracy. Similarly, democratic procedures and 
principles must be practised by CSOs in order for civil 
society to realise its potential. From the viewpoint of de-
liberative democracy (Habermas 1996; Benhabib 1994), 
associations generate public deliberations, but these deli-
berations are understood as either ‘without specific actors’ 
or ‘anonymous’ public conversations. 
Habermas is also sceptical about the bureaucratisa-
tion of civil society and the imposition of economic ‘logic’ 
on CSOs when the bureaucratic mentality and economic 
values dominate civil society. Under these circumstances, 
Habermas (1987) argues, the life-world of civil society 
is colonised. However, the term colonisation cannot be 
restricted to actions of political institutions alone. Ma-
nagerial norms and practices are formulated by and can 
emerge from disparate fields and circulate through an 
assemblage of actors, including think tanks, universities, 
and private consultancy agencies and can be used very 
effectively as the means by which the norms and values 
of an ideal civil society can be compromised.
The colonisation of civil society also distorts the afo-
rementioned structural differentiation of the state, eco-
nomy, and civil society. Traditional structural differen-
tiation requires that each domain functions in terms of 
its own internal ‘logic’. But bureaucratic mentality and 
economic norms are extrinsic to civil society because they 
originate and infiltrate civil society from without. They 
are extrinsic because bureaucracy detaches the means 
of social action from their ends, while the economy is 
grounded on the principle of cost-benefit calculation. 
Neither of these organising principles is authentic to ci-
vil society, which is presupposed to be the domain of 
communicative action. 
CSO participation in governance is considered to be 
a way to politicise governance by balancing the influence 
of business interests (Kaldor 2005; Keane 2009: Salgado-
Sanchez 2014 344). Paradoxically, the means of politici-
sation – civil society – has, in fact, been shaped by and 
incorporated into governance settings in a depoliticised 
vein. However, de-politicisation eliminates the possibility 
for contention, resistance, and critique that could emerge 
from within society. Thus construed, depoliticised parti-
cipation directs (or re-moralises) the interests of CSOs 
towards the norms and values of neo-liberalism and ma-
nagerialism. 
As some commentators have observed, some CSOs 
even integrate into the power structures of their govern-
ments. One of the reasons for the emerging ‘partnership’ 
of NGOs and power groups is the entitlement of status. 
In governance, status is conferred upon stakeholders, 
although as Erik Swyngedouw observes, the notion of 
stakeholder is ‘necessarily constrained and limited in 
terms of who can, is, or will be allowed to participate’ 
(Swyngedouw 2005, 2000). The conferring of stakehol-
der status contains an authoritative element that identifies 
governance participants: 
[I]n most cases, entitlements are conferred 
upon participants by those who already hold 
a certain power or status. Of course, the 
degree to which mobilisations of this kind are 
successful depends, inter alia, on the degree 
of force and/or power such groups or 
individuals can garner and on the willingness 
of the existing participants to agree to include 
them (Swygedouw, 2005, 2000). 
Thus, governance settings restrict the privilege of status 
as a governance participant and all- important funding to 
certain groups. Fierce competition to obtain funding, be-
come a stakeholder, achieve status, and fit into the insti-
tutional environment fosters an institutional Darwinism: 
in a managerial environment only the fittest among the 
institutions can survive (Jessop 2007, 193). In this case, 
being fit is about the ability to meet the requirements 
of the governance system (e.g., running an organisation, 
performing bureaucratic and reporting functions, and 
negotiating with other stakeholders). This implies that 
only organisations willing to play the game according to 
the rules remain within the institutional milieu. 
This ‘selection process’ may be unavoidable because 
it is impossible to financially support and integrate all 
groups into governance. The question here is the ground 
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on which such exclusion rests, i.e. which groups or what 
kind of civil society subjectivity is considered to be more 
compatible with governance. Not surprisingly, the voices 
of contentious and non-professional groups are excluded. 
Such exclusion is a moralising and constitutive political 
act because it both defines and constitutes suitable civil 
society actors for governance settings. In other words, 
pragmatic governance does not envisage civil society as 
an authentic and autonomous realm. 
Consequently, if civil society is to be understood as 
an autonomous domain, and if its authenticity is to be 
derived from reflexivity and communicative action, we 
must look for alternative ways to study the legitimacy of 
pragmatic governance as practised in CSOs. Under prag-
matic governance, both the autonomy and authenticity of 
civil society are distorted, and the various institutions of 
government, the private sector, and civil society generally 
share the same norms, values and practices. Pragmatic 
governance also restricts the generation of authentic rea-
son – reason that is not distorted by the economic sector 
or by bureaucracy – from within the ‘participating’ civil 
society. The new actors in civil society who are promo-
ted by pragmatic governance can be seen as part of the 
technocracy, in the view of Habermas, as constituent of 
a historic bloc or organic intellectuals, in the view of 
Gramsci, and as disciplined by the power of discourse, in 
the view of Foucault. 
Even more tellingly, pragmatic governance leaves a 
narrow space for CSOs to reinforce social progress. Li-
miting the function of CSOs as effective problem-solving 
actors, pragmatic governance construes the relationship 
between civil society and governance as one of domina-
tion, and occludes any opportunity for the emanation 
of communicative rationality, counter-hegemony, or the 
liberty to deny the requirements imposed by political ra-
tionalities. 
Let us consider the way in which civil society is con-
ceptualised in critical theory. For Habermas (1987), civil 
society is the space in which the ‘communicative rationa-
lity’, as opposed to economic and bureaucratic rationali-
ties, flourish. For Gramsci (1971), civil society is the space 
in which counter-hegemony is built. Foucault (2009) ar-
gues that counter-conducts, i.e. alternatives to hegemonic 
views on how to guide our social life and behaviours, 
emerge from civil society. If ‘critique’ is understood as 
the ‘art of discerning’, as generating an alternative way of 
reasoning or of doing things, and as detaching from views 
that are taken for granted in any given institution, CSOs 
participating in the governance system have limited space 
in which to be critical because of the very nature of the 
policy making processes and political patronage.
In a systemic understanding of governance, civil so-
ciety is supposed to be involved in governance as both 
an autonomous and authentic domain. But the norms 
and practices of pragmatic governance and the attempts 
of disparate actors to create managers out of civic acti-
vists run counter to that understanding. In pragmatic 
governance, civil society is not considered as being a pre-
existing domain that is waiting to be incorporated into 
the system of governance. Conversely, it is conceived as a 
domain constituted by actors that are becoming compati-
ble to pragmatic governance. Effective problem-solving in 
pragmatic government necessitates adopting expert skills 
and efficient management structures and adapting to pro-
fessional communication techniques in order to create 
better impact assessments.1 Master’s degrees are often 
preferred to a record of traditional grassroots activism, 
particularly in policy making processes, and manageria-
lism requires CSOs to think and act like bureaucrats and 
to adapt to a technocratic and bureaucratic culture that 
is very different from that of civil society. 
New civil society actors for the new era? 
How does pragmatic governance restrict and constitute 
civil society? Why should we consider NGOs engaged 
in pragmatic governance as new civil society actors? As 
part of my response to these questions, I argued above 
that because pragmatic governance prefers willing and 
capable actors and aims to detach politics from admini-
stration, CSOs engaged in governance are expected to 
act in a de-politicised manner. Yet, the de-politicisation 
and professionalisation of civil society are heightened by 
another social process that has been coupled with prag-
matic governance: managerialism. This term refers to the 
domination of the idea that social issues can be more 
efficiently organised and governed by professionally edu-
cated managers. For example, consider business school 
graduates, who are trained to manage any kind of orga-
nisation by the special expertise of managing. This ap-
proach is now connected to New Public Management, 
whose managerial norms and practices are now moving 
from the corporate sector to public institutions and civil 
society. 
As recent empirical research has shown, manage-
rialism has been disseminated globally among NGOs 
since the 1980s and influences ‘even the smallest NGOs’ 
(Roberts et al. 2005, 1849; Salamon 2010; Skocpol 
2003; Eikenberry and Kluver 2004). Managerial norms 
and practices, namely project cycle management and logi-
cal frame analyses, were first developed by the United 
States Agency for International Development (USAID). 
They are now commonly used by institutions supporting 
NGOs in developing countries for both effective project 
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management and accountability reasons (Roberts, Jones 
III and Fröhling 2005).2 They are also intended to shape 
the structure of these organisations: even the way NGOs 
communicate with the public and other stakeholders by 
reports, newsletters, webpages, and position papers are 
subject to these managerial techniques. 
Different disciplines have outlined various negative 
consequences of managerialism, including critical ma-
nagement (Parker 2002), governmentalisation of civil so-
ciety (Morrison 2000; MacKinnon 2000), and the repla-
cement of voluntary spirit in CSOs with a management 
mentality (Skocpol 2003). Managerialism is transforming 
social activists into problem-solving managers. It also 
hinders the development of civic bonds and community 
building, which are thought to be intrinsic to the ideal 
concept of civil society (Skocpol 2003). Furthermore, 
managerialism is understood as management of any kind 
of institution that operates by rules and assumptions re-
gardless of who or what is being managed (Burnham 
1942; Parker 2002). By applying similar management 
skills to all areas of social concern, managerialism also 
restricts creativity and the potential for the emergence of 
communicative rationalities (Parker 2002). 
Unfortunately, I cannot expand this important issue 
here due to the pressure of space, but readers might wish 
to visit the rich corpus of literature on this theme. In the 
following section, I now focus on at least four effects of 
the implementation of managerial knowledge and prac-
tices on NGOs. 
What does pragmatic governance and manageria-
lism do to civil society?
Pragmatic governance not only rationalises, but also ju-
stifies, normalises, and moralises managerialism in social 
action. This is how pragmatic governance directs the in-
terests and desires of people.
First, pragmatic governance is not solely a concern of 
political institutions – it also concerns the ethics of the 
self. It intertwines the governance of the self (as an active 
and responsible citizen), collective action (as results-based 
and results-oriented stakeholders who do not engage in 
contentious social conflict or activism), and governance 
models (as evidence- and activity-based management). 
Second, pragmatic governance and managerialism 
have implications for the moral foundations of society. 
Both treat discourses of social movements, such as the 
values of equality, solidarity, environmentalism, and hu-
man rights, not as ends in their own right. They do so by 
reinforcing a universal organisational and rationalisation 
framework for all kinds of social discourses (Robert et 
al 2005; Srinivas 2009). This type of management fra-
mework prioritises know-how, and privileges form over 
the content. 
The domination of managerial understanding in civil 
society leads to the normalisation of instrumental ratio-
nalities, or the cost-benefit approach to solving problems 
of the society. Kalberg argues that this normalisation is 
applied ‘to the degree that sheer calculation in terms of 
abstract rule reigns, decisions are arrived at „without re-
gard to persons“‘ (Kalberg 1980, 1158; see also Parker 
2002). Yet, this runs counter to the normative perspec-
tive that conceives organised civic action intrinsically as 
embodying a rationality that is political, i.e. one that 
represents public reason and thus reinforces social progress 
(Kaldor 2005). A consequentialist view of civil society 
also conflicts with the view that finds the merits of as-
sociation within the associational life itself. In critical 
theory, civil society is not restricted to a utilitarian vision 
that aims merely producing effective policies in order to 
satisfy the happiness of everyone.
Third, pragmatic governance and managerial prac-
tices make control and auditing possible. They aim to 
translate the activities of CSOs (goals, outcomes, results, 
and outputs) to calculable and measurable performance 
indicators by virtue of advancing models that specify 
how to quantify actions of CSOs. Numbers also make 
auditing and the control of CSOs easier and less costly 
(Power 1999). The strong emphasis on performance as 
the consequence of action, however, suggests that ideas 
or values that are not represented, or that cannot be re-
presented as performance, are either empty or nonsensical 
(Power 1999). 
For example, when a managerial approach is applied 
to NGO management, the ideas of the NGO are valid 
only to the extent that they can be translated into or 
represented in a tangible form, such as policy suggesti-
ons, reports, or communication tools. This is problema-
tic, since such a managerial approach reduces common 
good and civic discourses to a matter of utilitarian ethics. 
However, the merits of common good and civic values 
cannot be assessed in accordance with consequentialist 
criteria – they have merits in their own right. For in-
stance, a social movement protesting the building of a 
nuclear plant does not require professional organisatio-
nal knowledge or management based upon technocratic 
business approaches. The same is true for groups such 
as human right organisations, gender groups, and social 
groups that advocate the common good and aim to trans-
form power structures. Of course, this claim does not 
imply that civil society actors or social movements should 
obviate any kind of organisation and operate spontane-
ously at all times. The point is that one must question 
the emphasis on cost-benefit approaches (‘instrumental 
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rationalities’) and find alternative ways of organising wit-
hout having to implement managerialism and business 
approaches – they are not our destiny, they are a choice. 
It is fair to say that critical management studies have 
focused seriously on advancing such alternatives, such 
as promoting non-elitist and democratic organisations in 
order to counteract managerialism. In order to research 
these issues constructively, future studies could identify 
those alternatives and discuss their potential. 
Fourth, the involvement of CSOs in pragmatic gover-
nance may reinforce the status quo or legitimise socially 
unacceptable public policies. This is all the more serious 
because managerial norms and practices rely primarily on 
consequentialist ethics: they aim to legitimise the social 
purposes of organisations in terms of the outcomes of 
their actions, in this case, effective problem-solving. Such 
a view suggests that we are supposed to judge the merits of 
participatory governance merely in terms of its outcomes, 
or consequences, which detaches the practice (managerial 
governance) from action (problem-solving). 
However, outcomes alone cannot hold any purpose; 
they are not independent from the practices. Morally 
speaking, it would be more appropriate to suggest that 
purposes should determine outcomes because organisati-
onal outcomes are neither neutral nor apolitical in nature. 
Otherwise, from a Marxian perspective, the exchange va-
lue of managerial participation in pragmatic governance 
(consultancy, the symbolic use of participation and the 
prevalence of public relations technologies) dominates the 
traditional use value, or purpose, of civil society – i.e. 
restraining power, channeling public discourse, and rein-
forcing progressive social change. This argument implies 
that the methodology of social action (i.e. ways of doing 
things) and the ontology of social activism (i.e. social 
issues that call for the mobilisation of social action) are 
never neutral or apolitical; in this case, they are shaped 
and restricted by managerialism and neoliberalism, re-
spectively. 
Conclusion
In this paper I focus on the implications of pragmatic 
governance and the spread of managerial norms and 
practices globally among NGOs. I argue that pragmatic 
governance runs counter to the traditional approaches of 
civil society. It requires civil society actors, i.e. CSOs, 
that are compatible with the technocratic and managerial 
style of decision-making. However, I am not suggesting 
that political institutions are by nature ‘evil’ because they 
distort a well-functioning civil society, or that CSOs are 
mere orbits of political power. Both political and civil 
society actors are subject to the same social process, which 
de-configures and re-configures the boundaries between 
them under pragmatic governance and managerial thin-
king. If neoliberal governance and managerial formations 
are the ‘new reality’, participation of civil society in gover-
nance might be considered a ‘false activity’, because such 
participation does not result in progressive social change 
and, in fact, reinforces the status quo. 
The aim of this paper is not convince the reader that 
all public funding of CSOs is useless and wrong and 
should be suspended. Nor does it imply that all actions 
of CSOs are meaningless and that NGOs should be eli-
minated. Governments and donor institutions might use 
funding to create new venues for their programmes and 
ideological projects, and some CSOs might be willing to 
be instruments of political institutions in order to realise 
their goals. But we need to address the entangled pro-
cesses of technocratic policy making and managerialism 
that now inform, restrict, and constitute both political 
institutions and civil society. 
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notes
1. To prove their legitimacy to EU institutions, CSOs are re-
quired to adapt formal statutes and establish a transparent in-
ternal governance structure. As a result, most of the EU NGO 
networks now have similar organisational structures, i.e. one 
coordinator, one communication officer, and several policy offi-
cers. They have ‘General Assemblies’, where all members gather 
twice a year, their ‘Steering Committees’ make the important 
decisions, ‘working groups’ produce institutional outputs and 
the ‘Management Committee’ reviews overall organisational 
performance. Furthermore, they exhibit similar work meth-
ods: they all write yearly ‘activity reports’ to the Commission, 
‘disseminate’ and ‘publicise’ their achievements through similar 
technologies, i.e. newspapers, web pages, conferences, toolkits, 
and position papers. 
2. See European Commission (2004). 
